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Unlike sex, love is impossible. Lacan tells us sex - the sexual relation - is impossible: 
"What one calls sexual bliss is marked, dominated, by the impossibility of establishing, 
as such anywhere in the enunciable, the unique One which is important for us, the One of 
the relationship 'sexual relations."' But Lacan, as everyone knows, was no feminist. What,  
in part, he was getting at is in the heart of what he understands of the maculate processes 
of being masculine: "Phallic jouissance is the obstacle which stops man arriving at jouis- 
sance in the body of the woman, precisely because what he gets his bliss from is the jouis- 
sance of his own organ."' I t  is Zeno's paradox: Achilles's arrow never arrives at the spot 
that Brise'is has just vacated. But, of course, Brise'is has never completed her second step 
either, and the One which is pursued in the sexual act, the One of sexual union, is the 
One of the Real numbers, and it is itself infinite, because, like the step away from the 
speeding arrow, the price of its completion is death. 
This, oh best beloved, is the sole point from which love is comprehensible: the realm 
of paradox, the necessity and impossibility, the union and the infinite incompletion, the 
generosity and the fatality of love. Unlike sex, love is not eternal. Sex is just an instinct. 
Let us also say: It is an instinct that is incapable of finding satisfaction under any but the 
most fantastical conditions, conditions that, at any one time, can exist only for the tiniest 
proportion of the population, and then only for split seconds of historical time. The flam- 
boyance with which he pursued sexual gratification would seem to suggest that the 
Emperor Tiberius never achieved it. Confronted with the man who boasts constantly of 
his conquests, or worse, whose lackeys boast of them for him, one doubts the veracity of 
the tales of the harem of Haroun al-Raschid, and believes instead in the endlessly deferred 
delights of Scheherazade. This is where love emerges, through the truly secular delights 
that, unlike the divine, can never be attained. 
Love, after all, is pure and holy only if it is love, that is to say, if it is unrequited. Divine 
love can always be fulfilled, in the mystics' aching visions, in the deaths of virgins and mar- 
tyrs. But human love can find no peace in death with which it waltzes endlessly. The hum- 
ble, sublunary love is always fouled in the mires of the bodies here below; it is always a pale 
shadow of itself, its own retreating echo, fading even as it speaks. The narcissist is uninter- 
esting: the narcissist's lover, the nymph Echo, disappearing, swallowed in the marshes of her 
own unanswerable love - that is a creature as worthy of respect and devotion as the will-0'- 
the-wisp desire she follows in her internal exile. This is love, and there is more of it about 
today than ever before. It has ceased even to be desirable. Perversely, that can mean a return 
to the body, a reconstruction of jouissance, apart from the tedious tyranny of the prick. 
A tyranny whose reign is, in any case, credited with far more power than it really has; whose 
ominous grip on the conduct of human affairs is profoundly overrated, and whose ability to 
provide a lasting sense of good cheer is clearly inadequate to the planetary gloom it is 
charged with dispelling. The good news is that love has a history: it is only sex that endures. 
Love has a strange history; the story of frustrated communication. I take it  that the 
most fundamental quality of human beings is that we are social, cultural creatures, and 
that our common destiny is to share, to communicate, not for any particular purpose 
other than to speak to one another, to strike sparks, to be and to become cultured crea- 
tures. Everything else - politics, ecomonics, sex - is subordinate. The reproduction of the 
species is incidental to the communicative business of love. But as it has emerged in the 
twentieth-century West, love is a bogus communication, premised on the hidden, shame- 
ful, puritanical account for sexual action. That shame, as Lacan imagined, laid the founda- 
tions for a genital sexuality that lies incommunicado. For once (and only once) McLuhan 
was right: in sex, and sex alone, the medium became the message. 
But now, thank God, we can at least begin to see the far side of this enormous dead 
weight of hypocrisy and its necessary other, sexology. A terrible virus has not only caused 
deaths, but has made lives take on a particular shape. If ever it was envisaged as an Old 
Testament plague driven by a vengeful and malicious god, then the virus, as viruses will, 
has had its own revenge. In the wake of HIv and AIDS, there is more perversion, not less 
- a further reduction in the "natural" and "reproductive" functions of sexuality. 
In the absence of a governing image of sexuality, of love, of everything that is central 
to the secular worlds of Anglo-Saxony (whose commonest curse and blessing is "fuck", the 
mana of the West), there emerges a mode of sexuality that has even less to do with repro- 
duction, less to do with satisfaction, less to do with orgasm, less to do with penetration, 
less to do with the medium, and more, much much more, to do with the message. Sex 
becomes love at the moment it no longer is an end in and of itself. Even self-love needs, 
demands, an other to complete the vicious circle of Narcissus, the slippery Echo in which 
vanishes the otherness of the self, to itself in the narcissism - the newest pitfall in the 
romantic history of love. 
TV as metaphor for sex: If McLuhan was right even about this tiny corner of the commu- 
nicative universe, he was right only temporarily. No one ever learned anything about tele- 
vision by watching TV. You have to watch yourself watching TV, watch yourself making 
TV: that is TV culture. TV programmes are scarcely interesting because of what they say or 
do not say, or even the ways in which they say and refrain from saying. TV programmes 
are interesting only in the ways in which they speak to us about the conditions under 
which speaking and saying can be undertaken in our time, and about the history of how 
those conditions came to be. 
If the utopian image of communication pertains to a democracy of people and of 
media (where there is no such thing as broadcasting), then both McLuhan and Baudrillard 
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are caught between mistaking the ideal for the actual, the prognosis for the symptom, and 
the message for the medium. Terror of dialectical thinking drives both of them into a 
paroxysm of monomania. The trivialization of dialectic as "binary opposition," and its 
replacement with the tyrannical anti-tyranny of postmodern Babel, is a pseudo-anarchism 
in the service of the managed system. Its democracy is the democracy of the shopping 
mall, where everyone is equal in the eyes of the surveillance camera, where all knowledge 
is reducible to statistical likelihood and aberration. 
TV has become political: it has shed the role of communication in favour of that of 
rule. Watching TV has become political: it is an act of subservience or rebellion, but 
always within the parameters of a medium formed from the centre out, no matter how 
persuasive, how lovely, how far-out and right-on the terms and trances it proposes. Just so 
sex. There is no global village of sexualities. For far too long, sex was maintained in an 
artificial state of nature. Unable to recognize that this "innocence" was in fact a strait- 
jacket, sex could be posited as the secret of the world: either the greatest good or the 
greatest evil. By bringing ideology into sex, the Christian demand for reproduction took 
the innocence out, but brought the creative in. The secular demand for fun crams the sex- 
ual act with significance but drains it of meaning. 
What is so wonderful about this moment in the sexual life of the Occident is that it is 
about to lose its grasp on the almighty orgasm. The organs of jouissance, which have, 
with their French Theory handle, dominated the establishment of an apolitical canon of 
theory in the academies of North America, are at last revealed. 
Or rather, not. The organs that were once the secret and the centre of coming of age, 
of it, of going all the way, are covered over again, or revealed more nakedly and this time 
in public. The sorts of sexuality that once were labelled s s r ~  or posing are now everyday 
dreams and dramas. Fashions reek of the two alternatives available: the nuclear couple 
and kinky sex. We enter a new dialectic, a new moment: the moment of narcissism. Just 
as the TV viewer has ceased to seek communication with anyone on either side of the 
screen (slumping into the solipsism of the electronic relation), the solitary lover's love is 
deprived even of the pseudo-gratifications of the gonads. 
The communicative side of sex has taken over from the genital and the reproductive. 
It has done so at the same moment that the pursuit of individualism has reached new 
heights with the collapse of the nuclear family. The logics of the Reagan-Bush era in 
Anglo-Saxony are clear. The family, which was foisted on the urban populations of the 
industrial revolution as the only proper recompense for the loss of rural community, has 
begun to break down where it most counts: in the hinterlands of the ruling classes them- 
selves, the home turf of postmodernism - suburbia. Suburban sociology is the tale of the 
crisis and dispersal of the nuclear family. Sex was not an accidental arrival in the history 
of Western culture's secularization. Its purpose was and is to provide a social cement in 
the face of the decline in traditional social and cultural bonds like serfdom and slavery. 
The problem has always been that as soon as marriage was unleashed from the bondage 
of property and arrangement, it left romantic and sexual attraction to provide the 
supreme purpose in life as well as the links between individual and individual, clan and 
clan, uniting the members of the political nation-state. 
But sex simply could not bear the weight of all this. As the logic of advancing capital 
became more and more powerfully the right, the duty, of the individual to shit on every- 
one around, the function of sex became less a mode of social bonding and a bribe to 
the workers, and more a symbolic announcement of success, the bimbo as essential as the 
Rolex and the suit to the barometer of achievement. So what's love got to do with it? 
It  is another strange aspect of the dialectic that the more globally interlinked the 
moments of the communicative universe become, the more isolated and introverted 
become the people who make it up. It  is strange too that feminism, in its struggles to 
emancipate women from the status of unwaged labourers and sex workers in the home, 
and underpaid labourers and status symbols in the workplace, should have served, in has- 
tening the demise of the family, to speed the rise of the narcissist. Somehow we will need 

to understand the relationship between these terms of the contemporary dialectic, 
between the globalization processes and the emergence of a form of subjectivity which is 
entirely self-involved, and can reach out to others only through the mediating functions 
of intrapsychic structures, formations, and processes. 
What we must now have is pictures: the dialectic of love. The individual, for the first 
time a real sociological creation, is as unstable and cruel as the family it replaces. More 
so, since it allows fewer outlets for its own cruelty within the four walls that shrouded the 
nucleus of the nuclear for so long. Individuality is a flawed construction, marred already by 
the Oedipal trajectory of two hundred years of engineering and policing the family. An arti- 
fice of recent manufacture, scarcely known outside the West, this individual is unthinkable 
without the walls of global mediatization, of which it is both symptom and cause. 
The narcissistic psyche needs attention: that form of attention demanded by the infant 
child in the primary narcissistic phase, the attention which, otherwise, we might call love. 
But that love, at least from the early dawning of the modern age, is a love that knows 
itself only in the image, and more: only in the memory of the image: 
In quella parte 
dove sta memoria 
Prende suo stato 
chome 
Diafan dal lume 
d'una schuritade 
La qual da Marte 
viene e fa dimora 
Egli C creato 
e a sensato 
nome 
D'alma chostume 
di chor volontade 
Vienda veduta forma ches s'intende 
Che'l prende 
nel possible intelletto 
Chome in subgetto 
locho e dimoranza 
E in quella parte mai non a possanza 
Perch2 da qualitatde non disciende 
Risplende 
in sC perpetuale effecto 
Non a diletto 
m; consideranza 
Perch2 non pote laire ~imiglianza.~ 
And in the second of Pound's two versions: 
Where memory liveth, 
it takes its state 
Formed like a diafan from light on shade 
Which shadow cometh of Mars and remaineth 
Created, having a name sensate, 
Custom of the soul 
will from the heart; 
Cometh from a seen form which being understood 
Taketh locus and remaining in the intellect possible 
Wherein hath he neither weight nor still-standing, 
Descendeth not by quality but shineth out 
Himself his own effect unendingly 
Not in delight but in the being aware 
Nor can he leave his true likeness ~therwhere.~ 
"Risplende/in se perpetuale effecto": to shine forth as an effect of one's own perpetual 
unstillness, to be the form of colour, to be as one with the light which is itself universal. 
These are qualities which we have not lost through progress but through a programmatic 
history of forgetting. There is no reason why we should not be contemporaries of this 
theogeny of love, save only that we no longer care to reason out the dream in terms of 
metaphors that we refuse. No metaphor is ever exhausted; it is merely abandoned for the 
next. Love, standing in the place of memory, concerns the inexhaustible quality of the pre- 
sent as it is, forever a shining forth of the past. Love is the skill of rememoration, the 
archery of forgetfulness. Not sensory delight but awareness, that thin patina between 
memory and forgetting, between past and present, past and future, stands love - unpho- 
tographable. Like a camera obscura, the metaphysical love of Cavalcanti's canzone hoards 
light on shade, the image of an image, diaphanous as the moving traces of the light, a 
memory that cannot itself be memorized. 
Until, that is, the moment of the moving image, at which point love, like everything 
else, becomes utterly different. For if Cavalcanti's love finds being in the perpetual move- 
ment ("non si addorna / di riposa mai / Move changiando / cholr riso in pianto") that 
derives from the unfixed memory in the moving image (and we might now, reordering the 
hierarchies, mention too that the sounds which Cavalcanti didn't prize are, also, the 
sources of love's power) alters the being of love itself. For if love, before the moving 
image, becomes that being whose role is to engender, from the fixity of the image, the 
motions of the soul, then it becomes a process, a becoming, of memories in the controlled 
and fixed existence of segmented movement in the recorded frame and the vibrations of 
amplifiers. Love, now, is the memory of movement beyond its segmentation, of the instant 
as a motion before its seizure, of the possibilities within each moment lost by the snap- 
shooter. 
Love, for Cavalcanti, meets often with death. Indeed, some things change little in our 
world. The ars dmatoria belongs to that field of mortuary arts whose Bazinian aim is the 
conquest of death. But where Bazin wants the photograph to bear its witness of existence 
through the unravelling of chronological time, the love proper to the emergent narcissistic 
and global cultures of the era of the moving image and recorded sound concerns the ways 
in which the instant itself is the narrow gate to the infinite. In the time it takes the cam- 
era to make a shot of the fleeing Brise'is, she has already moved on. This presents prob- 
lems for the epistemology, if not the ontology, of the photographic image. But for 
Achilles, the hero drawing the bowstring, there is only the problem of mechanizing his 
weapon: of changing the eye from the status of a bow to that of a Gatling gun. For Brise'is, 
there is something much weirder at stake. 
That which lies at the heart of the moving image at its moment of origin is not the 
urge to document the real, but the desire to rewrite the moment of perception. The inno- 
cent invention is vired all too soon into the service of dire vignettes: family life, romance, 
lone heroics. But before Le repas de be'be', before even The Kiss, there are Fred Ott's Sneeze and 
La sortie d'zlsine - poems of the involuntary and incommensurable nature of perceptions. 
We read that early audiences were more impressed by the leaves moving in the back- 
ground of Louis Lumii.rels Le repas de be'be' than by the show of Oedipal trauma. The wis- 
dom of the pioneer audiences is remarkable. What most appeals to them is the quality of 
perceptions that cannot be stage-managed, like a crowd or a sneeze. Moments, irreducible 
in their complex integrity, their inconsequentiality, their emergence from the patterns of 
history or chronometers, the residue of the inexplicable in any perception. Of course, the 
cinema was born of the urge to destroy this terrible poetry by mastering and enslaving it 
in the name of science and commerce. As usual, the blunt instruments of the zoon politikon 
are administered on the creations of the communicative universe to ensure that the mini- 
mum of communication occurs. What delights us so in the cinema today is but the songs 
in chains of a medium in bondage. 
And still the evolutionary powers of the dialectic are unassuagable. The invention of 
digital imaging is a result of the attempt to solidify the grounds before the moving image 
- now increasingly restricted to the role of distribution media - moves in to capture the 
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fleeting real. If the camera's object is itself already an artifice, then its capture at the 
hands of another artifice is surely guaranteed. The postmodernists sigh with agreeable 
relief. The real has escaped into oblivion and need no longer try them. They hail the 
hyperreal: Death-in-life and Life-in-death. This might have been true, if cinema had ever 
dealt in the real. But it has not. The core and most intimate dialectic of the cinema has 
always been its love affair with the processes of perception. If, as Bazin more rightly 
argues, the cinema is movement (and the Western is cinema par e~cellence)~ and move- 
ment is not a quality of the real but of our perceptions of it (especially our temporal con- 
structions), what are we to find in the cinema if not the history of our perceptions, their 
regimes, their riots, their revolutions and their repressions? And in the digital image, 
what, if not the externalization of the truth we always threatened to reveal, that percep- 
tion is the slave of desire, as desire was perception's slave? 
At last the realism of the cinema admits to the subordination of photographic posi- 
tivism to psychic abandon. That this should happen first in formal terms is scarcely 
exceptional in a world whose processes of mediatization have only appeared to have been 
administered in the name of mass marketeering. For the secret has been that it is the 
undergrowth that has demanded the architecture: the spontaneous and undeniable evolu- 
tive powers of the communicative universe are as capable of manipulating the globaliza- 
tion of media enterprise as those enterprises are of manipulating the communicative 
ecosphere. The retreat into the intrapsychic is the next phase of a dialectic in which the 
inadequacy of individuality as a socially cohesive unity is at stake. For a Westerner it is no 
longer possible nor desirable to cling to identity. Love in the post-genital age is a matter 
of communications. Its tragedy and comedy are the interplay of the temporary, arrogant, 
and impossibly self-deluded (but therefore all the more boorish and brutal) machinations 
of the status quo - the as-yet infantile creation that is emerging from the morass of the 
media age: a species utterly dependent on one another. Narcissism is the last breath of 
individuality. Heave it and move on. 
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